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We present a scheme for implementing homomorphic encryption on coherent states encoded using phase-shift
keys. The encryption operations require only rotations in phase space, which commute with computations in
the code space performed via passive linear optics, and with generalized nonlinear phase operations that are
polynomials of the photon-number operator in the code space. This encoding scheme can thus be applied to any
computation with coherent-state inputs, and the computation proceeds via a combination of passive linear optics
and generalized nonlinear phase operations. An example of such a computation is matrix multiplication, whereby
a vector representing coherent-state amplitudes is multiplied by a matrix representing a linear optics network,
yielding a new vector of coherent-state amplitudes. By finding an orthogonal partitioning of the support of our
encoded states, we quantify the security of our scheme via the indistinguishability of the encrypted code words.
While we focus on coherent-state encodings, we expect that this phase-key encoding technique could apply to
any continuous-variable computation scheme where the phase-shift operator commutes with the computation.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.97.042308
I. INTRODUCTION
In classical cryptography, homomorphic encryption has
been a topic of intense interest in recent years [1–3]. It is a
form of encryption that allows a computation to be performed
on the encrypted text without having to first decrypt the text.
If an arbitrary computation is allowed, then the encryption is
said to be fully homomorphic. The first fully homomorphic
encryption scheme was only discovered recently by Gentry in
2009 [2]. However, like many other classical cryptographic
primitives, these homomorphic schemes only offer computa-
tional security, which means that they are secure as long as
certain problems are computationally intractable. The search
for information-theoretically secure encryption problems has
led to quantum analogs of homomorphic encryption [4–6].
These schemes only have to hide the quantum input to the
computation, unlike a related quantum cryptographic protocol
known as blind quantum computation (BQC) [7] which also
hides the desired computation. However, unlike BQC, no
interactive protocols are allowed in quantum homomorphic
encryption. Other schemes that perform quantum computing
on encrypted data that require interactions are known [8–11],
though confusingly some of them have been labeled as “quan-
tum homomorphic encryption” [8,9]. Others have focused on
hybrid schemes [12–14] that bootstrap on a classical fully
homomorphic encryption scheme to achieve computational se-
curity while allowing certain classes of quantum computations
to be performed on encrypted data. However, some restrictions
have arisen. It has been shown that efficient quantum fully
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homomorphic encryption is impossible [15,16], even when
relaxing from perfect to imperfect security. Nonetheless, the
key insights contributed by the advent of these quantum
schemes still expand the possibilities for implementations of
homomorphic encryption in various forms and for different
uses, especially since partial information security is still
possible for sets of computations of large cardinality [4,5].
It was shown in [4] that homomorphic encryption may be
implemented for a restricted class of quantum computation
known as the boson-sampling model [17–21]. In the boson-
sampling model, computation is performed via a passive linear
optical network with a subset of the input modes of this
network initialized with a single photon, and the remainder
initialized in the vacuum state. To implement the homomorphic
encryption described in [4], the client begins by inputting a
single photon into every mode, as opposed to just a subset of the
modes. Modes where a single photon should have been present
are vertically polarized, whereas modes where no photon
should have been present are horizontally polarized. Because
horizontally and vertically polarized photons do not interfere,
they effectively evolve independently through the linear optics
network, and by discarding all horizontally polarized photons
at the output the desired computation is recovered. Security is
achieved by applying the same random polarization rotation
to every photon before entry to the network. The angle of
rotation acts as the client’s private key, which is not disclosed
to the party performing the evaluation. After the evaluation,
the photons are returned to the user, who subsequently applies
the inverse rotation and discards all horizontally polarized
photons, thereby recovering the computation. However, in the
absence of knowledge of the key, it is difficult to differentiate
between photons that belong to the computation and those
which should be discarded. With this scheme, O(log2(m)) bits
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can be hidden when m bits are encrypted. Using group theo-
retical insights, this homomorphic scheme has been expanded
upon to enable quantum computation beyond boson sampling
while improving the security [5] to hide a constant fraction of
the number of bits sent. This fraction can be made arbitrarily
close to unity by increasing the number of internal states of the
bosons used to encode information.
Quantum information theory relies on representing infor-
mation using quantum states. The underlying algebra of the
states, and hence of the operations forming the encoding, affect
the performance of the encryption scheme. In this paper, we
explore the use of a phase rotation encoding for coherent-
state qubits. The advantages of using coherent states are
plentiful. Coherent states are produced relatively easily; a laser
source closely approximates a coherent state. In phase space a
coherent state is a “blob,” where the distance from the origin is
the amplitude of the coherent state and the angle is its phase.
Schemes exist to encode classical bits onto coherent states [22],
to create a collection of universal gate sets for computations
with these encodings [23,24], and to map general quantum
communication protocols involving pure states of multiple
qubits into one that employs coherent states [25]. The ease
of producing, manipulating, and distributing coherent states
has seeded continuous-variable (CV) analogs [26], primarily
featuring coherent states, of quantum cryptography schemes
such as quantum key distribution [27–29] and random ciphers
for quantum encryption [30,31].
In this paper, we present a somewhat-homomorphic en-
cryption scheme that utilizes a logical encoding onto coherent
states and encrypts with random rotations in phase space. The
scheme works as follows: each classical bit is represented on
a single coherent state. A random private key is generated,
and the same corresponding random phase shift is applied to
every coherent state. An evaluation that is made up of elements
from an allowed set of operations, G, is then performed on the
encrypted data. The set G contains beamsplitters, linear and
nonlinear phase shifts, and unitaries that commute with encryp-
tion operators. Both the Kerr and cross-Kerr interactions are
also included in G. In fact, any operator that preserves photon
number will work. Although this scheme follows a similar
principle to those of [4,5], it is a different primitive. The main
differences are that it is a continuous-variable protocol, and the
encryption and computation operators act on the same Hilbert
space nontrivially. The other two schemes are discrete-variable
protocols, and have encryption and computation operators that
act nontrivially only on distinct subspaces.
We quantify the security of our protocol with the trace
distance between any two encrypted inputs. In this notion of
security, an adversary without knowledge of the secret key
attempts to distinguish the encryptions of any two messages.
The smaller the trace distance, the more indistinguishable the
encrypted messages are to the adversary. We find this trace
distance by showing that the encoding operation induces a
partition structure in the states of the microcanonical ensemble
where most of the off-diagonal terms are zeroed out. The
partition structure gives a closed-form equation for the trace
distance between two encrypted inputs. By comparing this
trace distance to that for the corresponding unencrypted state,
we show that our encryption scheme suppresses the distin-
guishability of the encoded states and thus provides some se-
curity against an adversary attempting to identify the encoded
message. Our scheme demonstrates that quantum somewhat-
homomorphic encryption is possible for qubit encodings using
continuous-variable states. While we focus on a coherent-state
encoding, a similar phase-key encoding scheme might be
applicable to other CV computation schemes. In principle,
this encoding could be applied to any CV scheme where the
phase-shift operator commutes with the computation, for any
choice of basis states that are not rotation symmetric in phase
space, such as photon-number states.
II. LOGICAL ENCODING USING COHERENT STATES
Consider an encoding of logical qubits using coher-
ent states with |0L〉 = |α〉 and |1L〉 = |−α〉, where |α〉 =∑∞
n=0 e
− |α|22 αn√
n! |n〉 with α ∈ C. An m-bit binary string
x := (x1,x2, . . . ,xm) is represented by the tensor product
state |ψx〉 = |(−1)x1α〉 |(−1)x2α〉 . . . |(−1)xmα〉. These logi-
cal qubits are not orthogonal as | 〈α| − α〉 |2 = e−4|α|2 > 0.
Consequently, when m bits are encoded using the ensemble
{px,ρˆx}, where px is the prior probability for the string x and
ρˆx = |ψx〉 〈ψx|, the accessible information of the ensemble,
Iacc({px,ρˆx}), is less than m bits.
A lower bound on the accessible information of the
encoding ensemble can be obtained for a uniform prior
by the mutual information between x and the outcomes
given by a pretty-good measurement (PGM) [32], yPGM.
The assumption that the prior distribution of the code
words is uniform corresponds to the case where the eval-
uator has no prior information about the source. The
PGM is described by the positive-operator valued measure
(POVM) {ρˆ− 12 ρˆxρˆ− 12 ,x ∈ Zm2 }, where ρˆ = 12m
∑
x∈Zm2 ρˆx =
1
2m (ρˆ0 + ρˆ1)⊗m, ρˆ0 := |α〉 〈α|, and ρˆ1 := |−α〉 〈−α|. Here ρˆ−
1
2
denotes the pseudoinverse of the matrix square root of the
density matrix ρˆ.
Every element of the POVM is a tensor product over the m
modes, thus the mutual information for the m-mode inputs x
to outputs yPGM is
I (x; yPGM) = mI (x; yPGM), (1)
where the I (x; yPGM) is the mutual information for a single-
mode discrimination by the PGM. Let px(ℓ) := 12 and py(j )
be the prior and posterior probabilities for obtaining x = ℓ and
y = j , respectively. Then, we have
I (x; yPGM) =
1∑
j,ℓ=0
px(ℓ)p(j |ℓ) log2
(
p(j |ℓ)
py(j )
)
, (2)
where p(j |ℓ) := tr(j |ℓL〉 〈ℓL|), and j = 2(ρˆ0 +
ρˆ1)− 12 ρˆxj (ρˆ0 + ρˆ1)−
1
2 is the conditional probability that
the j th outcome was measured given that |ℓL〉 was sent, and
j :=
(
ρˆ0 + ρˆ1
2
)− 12
|(−1)jα〉 〈(−1)jα|
(
ρˆ0 + ρˆ1
2
)− 12
.
(3)
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The mixed state 12 (ρˆ0 + ρˆ1) has the spectral decomposition
a+ |ψ+〉 〈ψ+| + a− |ψ−〉 〈ψ−| [33] where the eigenvectors are
|ψ±〉 :=
|α〉 ± |−α〉√
2
√
1± exp(−2|α|2)
, (4)
with eigenvalues a± := 12 [1± exp(−2|α|2)], respectively. The
conditional probabilities are explicitly
p(j |ℓ) =
{
1
2
(√
a+ +√a−
)2
, j = ℓ
1
2
(√
a+ −√a−
)2
, j = ℓ
, (5)
and thus
I (x; yPGM) = (√a+ +√a−)2 log2(
√
a+ +
√
a−)
+ (√a+ −√a−)2 log2(
√
a+ −
√
a−). (6)
When |α| → 0, we have I (x; yPGM) = 2|α|2/ ln(2)+O(|α|4),
while, if |α| → ∞, I (x; yPGM) → 1. This is expected because
|α〉 and |−α〉 are barely distinguishable for small |α|, but
become nearly orthogonal as |α| becomes large.
III. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Here, we define encoding and decoding operations that
encrypt and decrypt the data. We follow the approach of [5],
wherein the encoding operators are chosen to commute with
those of the computation in the code space.
After the classical string is encoded onto coherent-state
qubits, the user chooses a key k uniformly at random from
the set {0,1, . . . ,d − 1}, where d is a positive integer. A
phase-space rotation is then implemented on every mode, each
with the same angle. The phase-space rotation operator on the
j th mode is
̂j (θk) = exp(−iθk aˆ†j aˆj ), (7)
where θk := 2πk/d. Such an operation on a coherent state
yields also a coherent state with the same amplitude, but
rotated in phase space by θk around the origin. The application
of the above operator on every mode gives a net operator
that is generated by the total photon-number operator, ˆN :=∑m
j=1 aˆ
†
j aˆj . The encrypted state is then processed before
decryption. The processing is performed by an evaluator, who
is able to process the encrypted state without knowing the
secret key. Finally, the output bit string y := (y1,y2, . . . ,ym)
can be determined by a measurement on the modes after an
inverse rotation ̂j (−θk). Since the computation operators are
conditioned to commute with the encryption (and decryption)
operators and the decryption algorithm is constant in the length
of the input, our scheme satisfies Broadbent and Jeffery’s
condition of correctness and compactness [12]. In the next
section, we will show that nontrivial computation operators
which commute with
⊗m
j=1 ̂(θk) exist. Then, we discuss
the complexity of these allowed computations in our scheme.
They are closely linked to boson sampling [17] and quantum
walks [34,35]—equivalent nonuniversal models of quantum
computation.
FIG. 1. The boson-sampling model. A string of n single photons
is prepared in m optical modes. They are evolved via a passive
interferometer U . Finally the photon statistics are sampled from the
distribution P (S).
IV. ALLOWED COMPUTATIONAL OPERATIONS
The evaluation of quantum operations on the ciphertext
is implemented via a unitary operator U = e−iH t/h¯ with its
evaluation Hamiltonian H implemented by quantum optical
components that are necessarily (Hermitian) photon-number-
preserving operators. Using Ehrenfest’s theorem, we have the
following evolution of the total photon-number operator N̂
under a given HamiltonianH : d 〈N̂〉 /dt = 1
ih¯
〈[N̂,H ]〉. Since
the evaluation operators do not change the photon number of
the input, then d 〈N̂〉 /dt = 0. This implies that 〈[N̂,H ]〉 = 0.
A set of photon-number-preserving computations that also
commutes with ˆN includes operations in passive linear op-
tics (phase shifts and beamsplitters) and operations that are
polynomials of the number operators. We call the latter set the
generalized nonlinear phase operations and their Hamiltonians
are of the form
HNL :=
∑
n∈Nm
gn1,...,nm
m∏
k=1
(a†kak)nk , (8)
where gn1,...,nm is a coupling constant. The single-mode Kerr
and cross-Kerr interactions are special cases of HNL [36]. Let
K be a constant that is proportional to a third-order nonlinear
susceptibility. The single-mode Kerr interaction is given by
m = 1, g1 = −h¯K , g2 = h¯K , and gn1 = 0 otherwise, while
the cross-Kerr interaction is given by m = 2, g1,1 = h¯K , and
gn1,n2 = 0 otherwise.
Passive linear optics is featured heavily in the boson-
sampling model, where we begin by preparingn single photons
in m optical modes (see Fig. 1). This input state evolves via
nonadaptive, passive linear optics, which implements a unitary
map on the photon creation operators, aˆ†i →
∑m
j=1 Ui,j aˆ
†
j .
The output state to the interferometer has the form |ψout〉 =∑
S γS |n(S)1 , . . . ,n(S)m 〉, where S represents a photon-number
configuration with n(S)i photons in the ith mode, and γS
are the associated amplitudes. Finally, coincidence photode-
tection is performed, which samples from the probability
distribution P (S) = |γS |2. Aaronson and Arkhipov showed
that sampling from P (S) is likely to be a hard problem
for classical computers for some scaling of m with n [17].
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Nonetheless, when the inputs to the circuit are switched from
single photons to coherent states, the quantum computation
performed can be efficiently simulated classically [37], using
simple m×m matrix multiplication. This changes, however,
when we also allow Kerr interactions in the circuit, because
this interaction allows the production of cat states from
coherent states [38]. For instance, in the interaction picture
where K(aˆ†aˆ)2 is regarded as the interaction part of the
evaluation Hamiltonian, an initial coherent state will evolve
to e−ih¯Kt(aˆ
†aˆ)2 |α〉 = 1√2 (e−iπ/4 |α〉 + eiπ/4 |−α〉) at time t =
π
2h¯K . Cat states when evolved via passive linear optics and
sampled with number-resolved photodetection implement a
classically hard sampling problem under plausible complexity
theoretic assumptions [39], although it is not believed to be
universal for quantum computation.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Without knowledge of the key, the encrypted input state is
E(ρˆx) : = 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
m⊗
j=1
̂j
(
2πk
d
)
|ψxj 〉 〈ψxj | ̂j
(
−2πk
d
)
=
⎛⎝ m⊗
j=1
V
xj
j
⎞⎠E(ρˆ0)
⎛⎝ m⊗
j=1
V
†xj
j
⎞⎠, (9)
where xj is the j th element of the string x, |ψxj 〉 := |(−1)xjα〉
is the state of the j th mode of |ψx〉, and Vj = ̂j (π ). If
someone without knowledge of the key were to attempt to
measure the encrypted input state, ρˆx, they would perceive a
state highly mixed in the phase degree of freedom, and have
difficulty in differentiating between states that belong to the
computation. This indistinguishability gives a security for our
scheme which we now make precise.
To quantify the security of our encryption scheme, we obtain
an upper bound on the trace distance between the encrypted
states given by D(E(ρˆu),E(ρˆv)) for arbitrary pairs of m-bit
strings u and v, where D(σ,τ ) = 12‖σ − τ‖tr denotes the trace
distance between the density matrices σ and τ . It suffices to
obtain an upper bound on D(E(ρˆx),E(ρˆ0)) where x = u ⊕ v,
because using the invariance of the trace distance under unitary
transformation we can get to the trace distance between any
pairs of encrypted states.
We first write the phase-shift operator on the Fock space
̂( 2π
d
) :=∑y∈N ωy |y〉 〈y| where ω = e−2πi/d and N is the
set of non-negative integers. Let φ(z) =∑i zi mod d. Now
for every integer ℓ, the matrix [̂( 2π
d
)⊗m]ℓ is equivalent
to
∑
y∈Nm ω
ℓφ(y) |y〉 〈y|. Hence, using the Fourier identity
1
d
∑d−1
ℓ=0 ω
ℓφ(y−z) = δφ(y−z),0,
E(ρˆ0) =
∑
z,y∈Nm
δφ(y−z),0bzb∗y |z〉 〈y| , (10)
where bz = bz1bz2 . . . bzm is a product of complex coefficients,
each given by bn := e−|α|2/2 αn√
n! . The state E(ρˆ0) admits a
block-diagonal decomposition, with each block labeled by
φ(y − z) = j . The support of the j th block is {|z〉 ∈ Gj : z ∈
N
m}, where Gj := {z ∈ Nm : φ(z) = j} is a partition of Nm.
Defining |gj 〉 :=
∑
z∈Gj bz |z〉, then
E(ρˆ0) =
d−1∑
j=0
qj |g˜j 〉 〈g˜j | , (11)
where |g˜j 〉 = |gj 〉 /√qj is a normalized state and
qj = 〈gj |gj 〉 =
∑
z∈Gj
|bz|2.
This partition structure makes it straightforward to compute
the trace distance between E(ρˆx) and E(ρˆ0). Using Eq. (10) in
the expression in Eq. (9), we have
E(ρˆx) =
d−1∑
ℓ=0
qℓ | ˜hℓ〉 〈 ˜hℓ| , (12)
where | ˜hℓ〉 is the normalized state
| ˜hℓ〉 =
m⊗
k=1
V
xk
k |g˜ℓ〉 =
1√
qℓ
∑
z∈Gℓ
bz(−1)x·z |z〉 . (13)
The states |g˜k〉 and | ˜hℓ〉 satisfy the relationship
〈 ˜hℓ|g˜k〉 =
{
Ak if k = ℓ
0 otherwise , (14)
where Ak = 1qk
∑
z∈Gk |bz|2(−1)x·z and is a real constant.
Owing to the orthogonality of the blocks in the block de-
composition of E(ρˆ0) and E(ρˆx), we can express the trace
distance between them as a sum across blocks. Let Ôk :=
| ˜hk〉 〈 ˜hk| + |g˜k〉 〈g˜k| − Ak | ˜hk〉 〈g˜k| − Ak |g˜k〉 〈 ˜hk|. Then
D(E(ρˆu),E(ρˆv)) = 12
d−1∑
k=0
qktr
(√
Ôk
)
=
d−1∑
k=0
qk
√
1− A2k,
(15)
where 1− A2k is the eigenvalue of ˆOk of multiplicity 2 (please
see Appendix A for derivation).
In the limit d →∞, we can drop the modulus in φ(z) and
use the multinomial theorem to simplify qk and Ak . We have
qk
d→∞= e−m|α|2 (m|α|
2)k
k!
(16)
and
Ak
d→∞= 1
qk
[m− 2wt(x)]ke−m|α|2 |α|
2k
k!
, (17)
respectively, where wt(x) is the Hamming weight of x =
u ⊕ v. Details of the derivation of qk and Ak are given in
Appendix B. If d is finite, the modulus in the definition of the
function φ(x) prevents us from using the multinomial theorem,
and these results would not apply. Explicitly, we have
D(E(ρˆv),E(ρˆu)) d→∞=
∞∑
k=1
e−EEk
√
1− (m−2wt(x)
m
)2k
k!
, (18)
where E = m|α|2, and once again x = u ⊕ v.
For comparison, we compute the trace distance between the
unencrypted states ρˆu and ρˆv which is equal to that between
the unencrypted states ρˆx and ρˆ0 for x = u ⊕ v, because of the
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FIG. 2. A plot ofD(E(ρˆu),E(ρˆv)) vs |α| form = 10 and d = 100,
and for various values of w = wt(u ⊕ v).
invariance of the trace distance under a unitary transformation.
This trace distance can be expressed in terms of a rank ma-
trix ˆQ := |ψx〉 〈ψx| + |ψ0〉 〈ψ0| − B |ψx〉 〈ψ0| − B |ψ0〉 〈ψx|,
where B := e−2wt(x)|α|2 . Specifically
D(ρˆu,ρˆv) = 12 tr
(√
ˆQ
)
=
√
1− B2
=
√
1− e−4wt(x)|α|2 , (19)
where 1− B2 is the eigenvalue of ˆQ (see Appendix A for
derivation). The trace distances in Eqs. (18) and (19) are plotted
for strings of length m = 10 in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
Figure 2 was calculated using an encryption key with d = 100.
The qualitative behaviors of the trace distances with and
without encryption are quite similar, with the trace distance
vanishing as |α| → 0, while approaching its maximum value of
unity as |α| grows. However, quantitatively, the trace distances
are suppressed for the encrypted states (see Fig. 4) and have
a lower spread over the different wt(x) values. The encryption
would make it harder for an adversary to distinguish between
the different encoded states, thus providing some modest
security. There is a tradeoff between security and the amount
of transmitted accessible information, and we recommend a
transmission that has a small but nonzero amplitude. In this
FIG. 3. A plot of D(ρˆu,ρˆv) vs |α| for m = 10 and d = 100, and
for various values of w = wt(u ⊕ v).
FIG. 4. A plot of R = D(E(ρˆu),E(ρˆv))/D(ρˆu,ρˆv) vs |α| for m =
10 andd = 100 for various weightsw = wt(u ⊕ v) values. The values
of R are less than unity indicating a suppression of distinguishability
by the encryption operation.
regime, the operations allowed for our scheme are believed to
be still of hard sampling complexity [39].
Let R := D(E(ρˆu),E(ρˆv))/D(ρˆu,ρˆv), and E := m|α|2. We
plotR versusm for (i)E = 1.0 and (ii)E = mr , where r = 0.3
in Fig. 5. The ratios are less than unity, indicating that the trace
distances are suppressed for the encrypted states. However, as
the ratios increase withm, this suppression diminishes with an
increasing length of the encoded string in both energy regimes.
The corresponding lower bounds on I (x; yPGM) are plotted
in Fig. 6, which shows I (x; yPGM) increasing with m for both
(i) E = 1.0 and E = mr where r = 0.3. This means that in
these regimes ofE someone with the secret key can send more
information with increasing code length.
One might hope for an energy regime in which I (x; yPGM)
increases, while the ratio R vanishes with increasing m.
However, this does not seem to be possible. Our scheme
is still useful in situations where secure delegated quantum
processing is desired when constrained to preparing simple
resources like coherent states, and to short code words.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a homomorphic encryption scheme
that allows processing on logical qubits encoded onto coherent
FIG. 5. A plot of R vs m with fixed wt(x) = 1 strings, where x =
u ⊕ v, and d = 100 for (i) E = 1.0 and (ii) E = mr , where r = 0.3.
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FIG. 6. A plot of I (x; yPGM) vsmwith d = 100, and fixed wt(x) =
1 strings for (i) E = 1.0 and (ii) E = mr , where r = 0.3.
states while encrypted by a random rotation in phase space.
Although the input states are classical, the set of allowed quan-
tum operations is hard to simulate classically. We analyzed
the security of our scheme through the trace distance of any
two encrypted code words and showed that there exist regimes
of coherent-state amplitudes and bit-string length in which
the trace distance can be suppressed, indicating increased
security afforded by the encryption. Our scheme is readily
implementable with existing optical network technology, and is
useful as a primitive for secure delegated quantum computing
using continuous-variable resources.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF EIGENVALUES
Let |x〉 and |y〉 be normalized states that are not orthogonal
to one another. Let |z〉 be a normalized state that is orthogonal
to |x〉 and in the plane spanned by |x〉 and |y〉. One can write
|y〉 in terms of |x〉 and |z〉 as
|y〉 = (|x〉〈x| + |z〉〈z|)|y〉
= |x〉 cos θ + |z〉 sin θ, (A1)
where cos θ = 〈x|y〉 and sin θ = 〈z|y〉. Then a given matrix
M = |x〉〈x| − C|x〉〈y| − C|y〉〈x| + |y〉〈y| (A2)
can be rewritten in terms of |x〉 and |z〉 as
M = |x〉〈x|(1− 2C cos θ + cos2 θ )
+ |x〉〈z|(−C sin θ + sin θ cos θ )
+ |z〉〈x|(−C sin θ + sin θ cos θ )
+ |z〉〈z| sin2 θ, (A3)
for which its eigenvalues are λ± = (1± C)(1∓ cos θ ).
When M = ˆOk , C = Ak , and cos θ = 〈g˜k| ˜hk〉 = Ak , we
have λ+ = λ− = 1− A2k . WhenM = ˆQ, C = B, and cos θ =
〈ψx|ψ0〉 = B, we have λ+ = λ− = 1− B2.
APPENDIX B: CALCULATION OF qk AND Ak IN THE
LIMIT d → ∞
In the limit d →∞, we can drop the modulus in φ(z) and
use the multinomial theorem to simplify qk and Ak . We have
qk
d→∞=
∑
z ∈ Nm
z1 + . . .+ zm = k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2(z1+...+zm)
z1!z2! . . . zm!
=
∑
z ∈ Nm
z1 + . . .+ zm = k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2k
k!
(
k
z1!z2! . . . zm!
)
= e−m|α|2 (m|α|
2)k
k!
, (B1)
where
(
k
z1,z2,...,zm
)
:= k!
z1!z2!...zm! is the multinomial coefficient
and
Ak
d→∞= 1
qk
∑
z ∈ Nm
z1 + . . .+ zm = k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2(z1+...+zm)
z1! . . . zm!
(−1)x·z
= 1
qk
∑
z ∈ Nm
z1 + . . .+ zm = k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2k
k!
(
k
z1,z2,. . .,zm
)
(−1)x·z
= 1
qk
e−m|α|
2 |α|2k
k!
[(−1)x1 + . . .+ (−1)xm]k
= 1
qk
[m− 2wt(x)]ke−m|α|2 |α|
2k
k!
, (B2)
respectively, where wt(x) is the Hamming weight of x.
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